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‘We Didn’t See it Coming’:1
The Conservatives
Theresa May’s decision to call an early election was clearly a foolish one—but
only in hindsight. After all, opinion polls had been showing the Conservatives
way ahead of Labour for months and they had not long before chalked up the
first by-election gain from the opposition by a governing party for thirty-five
years. Moreover, on almost every leadership measure one cared to mention,
Mrs May was beating Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn hands down. And if anyone
had counselled her to wait for the results of local election results before
deciding, they could easily have been accused of looking unduly cautious: in
the event, in England and Wales the Conservatives gained nearly 400 seats,
Labour lost nearly 250 and UKIP over 140, while the much-anticipated Liberal
Democrat revival came to nothing; north of the border, Labour and the SNP
both lost support, allowing the Conservatives to claim second place. Hardly
surprising, then, that all the talk was not of whether May would win but by
how many seats, and what would that mean both for Brexit and the future of
the Labour Party.
1. A personalised campaign with no personality
But behind the scenes at Conservative Central Office (CCHQ), apparently, not
everything was tickety-boo. Well-sourced accounts (albeit conflicting ones) of
the Conservative campaign suggest that it was, in fact, plagued with problems
from the start (Shipman, 2017, McTague et al., 2017). Overseas consultants
Lynton Crosby, Mark Textor, and Jim Messina had, along with CCHQ veteran
Stephen Gilbert, agreed to get the band back together in order to repeat their
2015 success. But not all of them were convinced that their new lead singer was
entirely wise to have called the election in the first place (Walters, 2017).
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And none of the band, it seems, were happy with the influence and control
afforded to her controversial personal managers, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill (see
Perrior, 2017). For their part (see Timothy, 2017) May’s advisors were apparently
unhappy at the way their boss was thrust front and centre of what, even in an era of
personalized politics, started out as an exceptionally presidential campaign—one
which, realising that voters were beginning to worry about the impact of continued
austerity on key public services, aimed to capitalize on the fact that the PM was
more popular than not only the leader of the opposition but her own party, too.
As a result, the party’s direct mail and leaflets played down Tory candidates’
Conservative Party affiliation in favour of associating them with the ‘strong and
stable’ prime minister. But, May—by all accounts something of an introvert—
was incapable of, or at least uncomfortable with, getting out there and convinc-
ingly selling herself. So, rather than being forced to meet ordinary voters, she was
instead smuggled into all-ticket events in soulless out-of-town warehouses filled
(if that’s really the right word) with her own party activists gathered together at
short notice for yet another unconvincing photo op. And even those rallies were
too often held in constituencies that Labour held on to rather than in those
which, in hindsight, the Tories should have been ensuring really were as safe as
they, in their hubris, believed. Neither the optics nor the itinerary, in other words,
did the PM or her party any favours.
Nor, in all probability, did May’s reluctance to take part in the kind of televised
debates that had enlivened the elections of 2010 and (to a lesser extent) 2015. That
reluctance was understandable—a format that requires a politician to think on
their feet and at least pretend to answer questions from ‘real people’ was unlikely
to suit her (see Prince, 2017). And as the incumbent with a record to defend, as
well as the apparent front-runner, May probably had more to lose than to gain
from appearing. But when Labour suddenly announced that Jeremy Corbyn had
decided, after all, to take part in the big, televised leaders’ debate on 31 May, the
PM’s refusal to do the same made her look scared of getting into the ring with
him—and she looked even worse, perhaps, when it was revealed that Home
Secretary, Amber Rudd, who deputised for her, had agreed to do so just days after
the death of her father. May’s no-show also re-doubled what by then was already
widespread criticism of a Conservative campaign clearly desperate to protect the
woman who journalists had cruelly dubbed ‘the Maybot’ from contact with mem-
bers of the public—in marked contrast to Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn, who was con-
stantly pictured speaking spontaneously and authentically to ecstatic crowds.
Yet when May did come into contact with ‘real people’, albeit in a television
studio, it was immediately apparent why her minders had been so worried about
the possibility. It might not have been a complete coincidence that things really
began to slip away from the Conservatives after her appearance in front of a live
studio audience less than a week from polling day, when, rather patronisingly
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perhaps, she told a nurse complaining about her pay that ‘there isn’t a magic
money tree that we can shake that suddenly provides for everything that people
want.’ YouGov’s Political Tracker poll showed the Prime Minister’s net approval
rating dropping from þ18 on 11 May toþ 9 on 25 May and to -5 by 1 June.
Wheeling out Boris Johnson, which some at CCHQ were now suggesting in the
hope that he could inject a bit of life into the Conservative campaign, could have
done nothing to arrest that slide. Indeed, the contrast between his shambling
star-quality and her charisma by-pass would only have made things worse.
2. Underlying organizational and operational shortcomings
Even if Mrs May’s own performance hadn’t left so much to be desired, the
Conservatives would still have had to cope with some long-term structural prob-
lems (see Beckett, 2017). The most obvious of these was that the party had (and
still has) fewer members (circa 150,000 according to the most recent available
estimate) and therefore almost certainly fewer activists, than its Labour rival
(517,000 going into the election). Two years previously, the Tories got around
this problem by organising Team 2015 and bussing bunches of activists on ‘road
trips’ to campaign in marginal constituencies. However, they dared not repeat
the trick this time around after the resulting row over the allocation of costs
between national and constituency campaign expenses got them into consider-
able trouble (Electoral Commission, 2017). As a result, the Conservatives’
‘ground game’ almost certainly suffered in comparison to Labour’s.
Moreover, the Conservative ground game was further hobbled by CCHQ appa-
rently insisting that the few volunteers local associations were able to muster
should focus their voter contact effort on lists of likely supporters conjured from
big data compiled at the centre rather than from locally-led canvassing—a deci-
sion which, according to many activists, led them to the homes of people who
would never have voted Tory in a million years. Things weren’t made any better
either when, as those activists began to report back that some of the
Conservatives’ target seats looked less than winnable, there was little or no effort
made to divert them back to defending seats that suddenly looked to be in danger.
These issues only served to fuel a degree of distrust between many local associ-
ations and Conservative Campaign Headquarters that had already been sparked
by the way the latter (perhaps inevitably given the fact that May’s sudden
announcement of an election left it only a couple of weeks to get things sorted)
had short-circuited candidate selection procedures (Wallace, 2017). In constitu-
encies where incumbent Tory MPs were stepping down, and in target seats,
CCHQ was permitted to oblige local associations to choose from shortlists (some
of them very short indeed) that it had put together without consultation, and in
non-target seats it was allowed simply to impose a candidate—indeed, in
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Scotland (with one or two exceptions) the latter was the norm. Attempts by asso-
ciations to push back against such efforts proved fruitless in most cases, serving
only to strain relations even further. Moreover, a number of would-be candidates
(many of them activists) found themselves left out in the cold by an opaque and
sometimes chaotic vetting system that had insufficient time to properly consider
applicants’ campaign records and, some complained, was designed to allow peo-
ple favoured by ‘the higher-ups’ to get the official approval required to be placed
on shortlists or imposed on associations. All in all, the process left a bad taste in
the mouth of many grassroots members and did nothing to help morale—not
good when the party was short of members in the first place and badly needed
those it did have to enter the fray with enthusiasm.
The damage done to the morale of the Tory grassroots may go some way to
explaining the relative decline in their campaign activity during the election.
Table 3.1 reveals that across a range of nine different activities about which the
ESRC-funded Party Members Project asked party members during the election
campaigns of 2015 and 2017, the percentages of Conservative members claiming
to have done them dropped in every case. While this was also true of Labour’s
members in a number of cases, it was not so for all activities, and never by as
much. The Tories suffered particularly notable drops in the proportion of mem-
bers reporting having delivered leaflets, attended hustings and canvassed—the
last of these being of obvious importance for mobilizing electoral support at con-
stituency level. The mean change in the Conservative column of Table 3.1 is -7.2,
compared to just -1.7 for Labour—and Labour, of course, had four times as
many members in the first place. When it came to grassroots campaign activity,
then, the governing party was probably way behind the opposition.
Table 3.1 Campaign activities of Conservative and Labour Party members, 2015-2017
% saying they did the following: Conservative
(N51002)
Labour
(N51024)
Displayed election poster in window 21.6 (-8.0) 55.4 (þ4.2)
Delivered leaflets 30.5 (-13.0) 31.6 (-10.9)
Attended public meeting or hustings 19.8 (-11.5) 24.9 (-6.5)
Canvassed face to face or by phone 21.3 (-15.2) 27.1 (-8.6)
‘Liked’ something by party/candidate on FB 39.3 (-0.3) 63.4 (þ12.3)
Tweeted/re-tweeted party/candidate messages 24.2 (-1.8) 38.5 (þ1.6)
Helped run party committee 7.0 (-5.0) 4.1 (-4.3)
Drove voters to polling stations 2.3 (-4.1) 4.8 (-2.4)
Other 10.2 (-6.1) 13.6 (-0.6)
None 24.7 (þ1.7) 9.3 (-3.6)
Note: All figures are percentages. Figures in parenthesis represent percentage point changes 2015-2017.
Source: Party Members Project surveys, 2015 and 2017. See http://esrcpartymembersproject.org.
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In addition, CCHQ’s much vaunted dominance over Labour when it came to
digital campaigning in 2015 turned out to be ephemeral, always presuming that it
wasn’t merely a myth created by Cameron’s surprise success last time round.
Grassroots Conservatives are not renowned for being up with the latest develop-
ments in social media. But even they noticed very early on that they were being
outgunned online—not least because CCHQ seemed to think that its paid-for
ads on Facebook and YouTube videos would be able to compete with the torrent
of rather edgier, savvier and far more share-worthy content and memes being
produced by Labour, Momentum, and by their supporters on a do-it-yourself,
‘organic’ basis. Again, Table 3.1 offers clear evidence that Labour’s members were
far more politically engaged with social media than their Tory counterparts dur-
ing the campaign. Moreover, while Labour already enjoyed a head-start over its
major party rival at the outset of the campaign, evidence suggests that it further
benefited from a 61% increase in the numbers of their ‘followers’ on social media
during the six weeks of the election campaign, compared with a six per cent rise
for the Tories (Morgan, 2017). Thus, the digital reach of the Labour Party seems
to have been significantly greater than that of the Conservatives.
3. Self-inﬂicted wounds
But problems with the operational, organizational and digital aspects of the
Conservative campaign cannot disguise, and were not responsible for, its short-
term tactical failures. One of the earliest (and least commented on in the
so-called ‘Mainstream Media’, though not on Facebook and Twitter) was a com-
mitment to a free vote in Parliament on the reintroduction of fox-hunting—an
activity opposed by over three-quarters of the public. May’s support for the idea
(according to the many Conservative activists who detected it damaging their
cause on the doorstep) badly undermined the attempt made by the party since
she took over as Prime Minister in July 2016 to argue that she wasn’t one of those
‘same old Tories’ (Lowe, 2017).
The pledge on fox hunting, however, was just one item among many in a
largely uncosted and pessimistic Tory manifesto which might have been expressly
designed to re-toxify rather than de-toxify the party (Maltby, 2017) and to put
off rather than pull in voters. Special mention, however, should go to those poli-
cies impacting on the elderly—a group whose support the Tories could (and per-
haps at this election did) take for granted. Believing they would win the election
and therefore be back in government, and realising that they needed more room
for manoeuvre on the fiscal front, the Conservatives refused to give an open-
ended commitment to continuing the so-called ‘Triple Lock’ on pensions intro-
duced by David Cameron and George Osborne or the winter-fuel payments
brought in before 2010.
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Even more damaging, however, at least according to both opinion polls and
anecdotal evidence, was the proposal that the value of an individual’s house (over
and above £100,000) should be included in the calculation of assets used to deter-
mine their contribution to the bill for their social care—a suggestion swiftly and
very effectively branded ‘the dementia tax’ by opponents and the media. This
chorus of criticism precipitated a screeching U-turn by Mrs May, who then man-
aged to make matters even worse for herself by insisting, to the incredulity of
everyone watching, that ‘nothing has changed’. Turning out to be ‘weak and wob-
bly’ rather than ‘strong and stable’ was bad enough; treating voters like idiots
turned out to be calamitous.
4. Longer-term problems: austerity and insecurity
But it was as much about what was not in the manifesto as about what was in it
that got the Tories into trouble. Irritation with May’s tin-eared, ‘magic money
tree’ riposte to the nurse who had asked her on live television about pay tapped
into wider concern on the part of voters—including some who nevertheless went
on to vote Conservative if post-election polling is anything to go by—that key
public services (and the people who work in them) were coming under serious
financial strain as the result of the austerity policies pursued by the government
since 2010. Lived experience remains crucial to the way people vote, and no-one
with school-aged children or anyone who had needed to use the NHS could have
failed to notice that, however much ministers repeated the mantra that spending
on both was at record levels, education and healthcare were running desperately
short of resources. At least some of those voters would also have noticed that
those same ministers, after years of telling the public that savings must be made
in order to balance the books, had not only manifestly failed to achieve that goal
but now seemed surprisingly relaxed about extending the timeframe to meet it in
order to accommodate any negative economic effects brought about by Brexit—a
historic change which, voters had been told during the referendum campaign,
would mean an extra £350 million a week for the NHS. Nearly a year later, it was
obvious that any such windfall would be a long time coming, if it ever came at all.
It was also obvious by then that talk of Mrs May being a new kind of
Conservative—talk which seemed to rest on little more than a couple of speeches
penned for her by Nick Timothy before she entered Number Ten as Prime
Minister—looked wide of the mark. There was certainly precious little sign in the
Tory manifesto of much being done either directly or indirectly for the so-called
‘Just About Managing’, or the public services they relied on, and all this at a time
when growth was slow and when even those fortunate enough to get a pay rise
were increasingly finding that any gains made were quickly offset by prices driven
up by the fall in sterling precipitated by the referendum result (see Corlett et al.,
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2017). After the election, some Tories wondered why their party hadn’t talked
more about the economy: they should have realised that there was a reason for
that.
Perhaps if the Conservatives had been facing a Labour Party believing
that it was on the verge of getting into government and therefore as des-
perate as it had been in 2015 to (i) prove that it was fiscally responsible
and (ii) avoid giving any hostages to fortune, none of this would have
proved quite so problematic. Unfortunately, however, Labour under Jeremy
Corbyn had few expectations of winning the election and was anyway more
ideologically inclined to oppose austerity. As a result, it was prepared to
make a positive, optimistic and even idealistic (though some would say
unrealistic) offer to the electorate involving an end to pay restraint in the
public sector as well as big increases in spending on key services—all paid
for by tax rises that would supposedly hit only big business and the rich.
Corbyn was also confident enough, after a second terrorist attack during
the campaign looked like it might hand an advantage to the Prime
Minister, to counter the accusation that, as an apparent supporter of any
number of paramilitary organizations around the world, he was ‘soft-on-ter-
rorism’. The Labour leader responded with a claim that she, as Home
Secretary, had cut police numbers in order to save money and balance the
books. The score-draw that resulted from the charge and counter-charge
may have been unseemly—Corbyn supporters were particularly irritated by
a Tory Facebook advertisement on the issue which achieved 6.6 million
views—but the fact that the terrorism issue was not an easy victory for the
Conservatives was in effect a win for Labour.
The intense media discussion of both the terrorist attacks and the parties’
manifestos also dovetailed with a natural (and some would say entirely proper)
desire on the part of journalists during elections, first, to avoid slavishly following
the agenda set by politicians and, second, to discuss the policies being presented
to the electorate. This proved problematic for a Conservative campaign that had
hoped to keep the focus away from policy and instead on who would be best able
to negotiate Brexit. As a result—and also as a result of Jeremy Corbyn’s better-
than-expected media performances and Labour’s more-popular-than-expected
manifesto—the Conservatives did not enjoy the kind of effortless superiority in
broadcast and print coverage that they had anticipated (Deacon and Smith,
2017). Given the fact that they anticipated (quite rightly it turns out) no such
superiority when it came to social media, which is clearly becoming an increas-
ingly important part of the mix, this must have come as quite a blow (see Bond,
2017). The media, mainstream or social, doesn’t have as big an impact on election
outcomes as some imagine (see Newton, 2006) but it’s always nice to have it
firmly on one’s side.
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5. Winners and Losers
We need, however, not to get so carried away by the contrast between what many
thought would happen to a Corbyn-led Labour Party and what actually happened
(as well as between the smart campaign we expected from the Conservatives and
the maladroit one they actually delivered) that we forget the fact that the Tories
garnered their biggest share of the vote since 1983. Nor should we ignore their
much improved performance in Scotland, where the popularity of Ruth
Davidson, the Tory leader there, undoubtedly contributed to the party virtually
doubling its share of the vote to 28.6% and boosting its share of Westminster
seats from just one to 13. It is also worth noting that, according to a number of
large-sample post-election polls (principally those conducted by Lord Ashcroft,
YouGov and Ipsos MORI), the Conservatives made big gains in Great Britain as a
whole among working-class voters, particularly in the private sector, registering
gains of over ten percentage points among not just semi- and unskilled workers
but also among the C2 voters fabled for swinging elections one way or another
(see Table 3.2). Polling and constituency breakdowns suggest that a large part of
that gain derived from Mrs May’s much-trumpeted determination to ‘take back
control’ of Britain’s borders by ensuring that ‘Brexit means Brexit’—hence the six
seats gained from Labour in the wake of their recording big majorities for Leave
in the 2016 referendum: Copeland, Derbyshire North East, Mansfield,
Middlesboro South, Stoke South and Walsall North. More generally, the
Conservatives recorded a higher share of the vote in 2017 than they had in 2015
in areas of the country that voted to leave in the referendum.
Those gains were very much of a piece with the strategy followed by Theresa
May since becoming Prime Minister, namely to hoover up voters who might oth-
erwise have supported UKIP by offering them not just a hard Brexit and further
action on immigration but also signature policies like a return to grammar
schools. And, on the surface anyway, the strategy looked like a roaring success.
UKIP, now without its iconic leader, Nigel Farage, dropped further and further
down in the opinion polls and at the election fell from 12.6% of the vote in 2015
to just 1.8%. Analysis of post-election polling, however, suggests that a significant
number of erstwhile UKIP supporters, reassured by a combination of
Conservative rhetoric and Corbyn’s promise to respect the result of the referen-
dum, felt no obligation to vote Tory, especially when they and those around
them probably had more to gain materially from Labour’s left-wing pitch than
they did from continued austerity under Mrs May and her colleagues.
Meanwhile, analysis of constituency voting reveals, possibly rather surprisingly,
that in those seats where UKIP decided not to stand a candidate (perhaps in order
to give a Brexit-supporting Tory a clear run, perhaps simply to save money),
Labour rather than the Conservatives tended to be the main beneficiary. As a
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result, and because Labour often had reasonably-sized majorities anyway in many
‘Leave’ constituencies, the improvement in the Conservatives’ vote share in those
places was insufficient to deliver them anywhere near the number of seats they
had been hoping for.
Moreover, the flip side of the Conservatives’ efforts to attract working-class
‘authoritarian’ and anti-immigration/anti-European voters was the backlash they
Table 3.2 The demographics of voting, 2017
Conservative Labour Lib Dem Turnout
(registered
voters)
Labour to
Conservative
Swing
All 44 (þ6) 41 (þ10) 8 (0) 69 (þ3) 2
Gender
Male 44 (þ6) 40þ11 7 (-1) 67 (þ2) 2.5
Female 43 (þ6) 42 (þ9) 8 (0) 69 (þ3) 1.5
Age
18-24 27 (-1) 62 (þ20) 5 (þ1) 64 (þ21) 10.5
25-34 27 (-6) 56 (þ20) 9 (þ2) 64 (þ10) 13
35-44 33 (-2) 49 (þ14) 10 (0) 63 (-1) 8
45-54 43 (þ7) 40 (þ8) 7 (-1) 72 (0) 0.5
55-64 51 (þ14) 34 (þ3) 7 (-2) 73 (-4) þ5.5
65þ 61 (þ14) 25 (þ3) 7 (-1) 73 (-5) þ5.5
Social Class
AB 47 (þ2) 37 (þ11) 10 (-2) 73 (-2) 4.5
C1 44 (þ2) 40 (þ12) 7 (-1) 74 (þ6) 5
C2 45 (þ13) 41 (þ9) 6 (0) 66 (þ4) þ2
DE 38 (þ12) 47 (þ6) 5 (0) 61 (þ5) þ3
Housing Tenure
Owned 55 (þ9) 30 (þ7) 7 (-2) 73 (-4) þ1
Mortgage 43 (þ4) 40 (þ8) 9 (0) 72 (þ3) 2
Social renter 26 (þ8) 57 (þ8) 4 (þ1) 60 (þ4) 0
Private renter 31 (þ3) 54 (þ15) 7 (þ1) 65 (þ14) 6
Ethnic group
White 45 (þ6) 39 (þ11) 8 (0) 69 (þ1) 2.5
All BME 19 (-4) 73 (þ8) 6 (þ2) 64 (-6) 6
Education
No qualifications 52 35 4 64
Other qualifications 46 39 6 67
Degree or higher 33 48 12 76
EU Ref vote
Remain 33 47 13 78
Leave 46 39 7 69
Did not vote 23 66 4 25
Source: Adapted from ‘How Britain Voted 2017’, Ipsos MORI estimates , accessed at https://www.ipsos.com/
ipsos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2017-election?language_content_entity¼en-uk. All figures are percen-
tages. Figures in brackets indicate change since 2015.
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seem to have suffered in constituencies which voted for Remain, many of them in
urban areas containing high concentrations of (often younger) well-heeled, well-
educated, AB (or, if they were students, future AB) voters and/or voters from eth-
nic minorities. As a result, many Labour MPs who thought earlier that they were
facing almost certain defeat ended up with much bigger majorities (Rupa Huq in
Ealing Central and Acton who won by just 274 votes in 2015 but by 13,807 in
2017 being perhaps the most striking example) while others who thought they
had little chance of snatching their seats from Tory incumbents managed to do
so—Emma Dent Coad in Kensington springs immediately to mind. Meanwhile,
the return to the Commons of the former Liberal Democrat minister Vince
Cable, in his old seat in Twickenham, at the expense of the Tory opponent who
had defeated him in 2015 was almost certainly down, at least in part, to the
Tories’ failure to replicate their increased appeal among white working-class vot-
ers among their middle-class counterparts.
Every bit as importantly, the Conservatives’ nationalistic and narrow-minded
thrust did them no favours with younger voters either. And ‘young’ doesn’t mean
only those 18-24 year olds (many of them students) who were so taken by Jeremy
Corbyn that they contributed to Tory defeats in university towns like previously
true-blue Canterbury. It also included (see Table 3.2) 25-44 year olds, a fair pro-
portion of whom were struggling to get on the housing ladder in an era of rising
prices, stagnant wages and limited construction, and some of whom were getting
letters home from their children’s schools asking them to contribute toward basic
costs or informing them of cuts to staffing.
The Tories suffered an especially sharp swing to Labour among voters living in
the private rental sector, many of whom are increasingly despondent about the
prospect of ever owning their own homes given the long-term crisis in housing
that has been slowly fomenting across the country. Whether or not the news that,
in the wake of the dementia tax, they might not even stand to inherit much from
their parents came as the final straw, we may never know; but many of them were
clearly unimpressed by a Conservative manifesto and leadership that appeared to
offer not much more than Brexit and continuing austerity. Perhaps if Mrs May
had been able to offset such losses by boosting turnout among retirees, who con-
tinued to vote Tory in much greater numbers, she might have triumphed. But,
possibly due to her manifesto, the elderly voted less in 2015 than in 2017 (see
Table 3.2)—something that Lynton Crosby, speaking afterward, clearly consid-
ered significant (Knaus, 2017).
6. What is to be done?
This was an election at which everything that could go wrong for the
Conservatives did go wrong. The manifesto, which May’s (now former) Chief
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of Staff Nick Timothy believed would be an asset, turned into a liability, con-
firming the belief of her campaign consultant Lynton Crosby that the contest
between the parties needed to be framed in terms of leadership. Unfortunately,
however, Theresa May simply wasn’t the kind of presidential politician who
could carry that kind of campaign. Nor did Brexit do her or her party as much
of a favour as everyone had expected. For one thing, she seemed to think she
could get away with mouthing mantras and platitudes about leaving the EU,
opening up a vacuum that other issues rushed in to fill. For another, the num-
ber of UKIP, older, poorly-educated and working-class voters that the party
gained as a result of the government’s tough talk on Europe seems to have
been outweighed by the number of younger, better-educated, middle-class,
Remain voters who were alienated and infuriated by it—and by May’s claim at
her party conference that ‘If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are
a citizen of nowhere’ (Bush, 2017). More generally, the Tories suffered because
they were unable or unwilling, ideologically or otherwise, to respond
convincingly—or even, to be honest, at all—to increasing voter concern about
ongoing cuts to key public services.
Clearly, the Tories need to re-think a number of things in terms of strategy
and organisation—something former Party Chairman, Eric Pickles, has since
reported back on Conservative Party (2017). How they do voter identification
and whether they have over-centralised their operation should clearly be key con-
cerns, as should how they can better exploit truly local intelligence effectively. It
will not be easy because any review worth the name is bound to bring into focus
the often fraught nature of the relationship between local associations and CCHQ
(or Central Office, as it used to be known). Moreover, the Conservatives will have
to do all this at the same time as managing a precarious parliamentary situation
while charged with the greatest challenge to confront a government in living
memory: the successful negotiation of the United Kingdom’s exit from the
European Union. And the task will be made all the harder by the fact that they
are led by a Prime Minister who, in the wake of the election, has manifestly lost
the confidence of the British people and many of her own followers and col-
leagues, despite having garnered an increased share of the vote across the country.
The Conservative Party has a history of ruthlessly dispatching leaders once they
are perceived to have become electoral liabilities, so Theresa May’s time in
Downing Street may be limited, even if, in the immediate aftermath of the elec-
tion, there was little appetite in the party for replacing her, not least because there
was no agreement on who might best replace her (Savage, 2017). Whoever even-
tually does so will be confronted with a huge political task if he or she is to con-
struct a broad and winning electoral coalition better capable of turning votes in
the country into seats in parliament.
56 Britain Votes 2017
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/71/suppl_1/46/4930853
by Sussex Language Institute user
on 05 April 2018
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant
number ES/M007537/1). We would also like to thank our colleague on the
Project, Dr Monica Poletti.
References
Beckett, A. (2017, 27 June) ‘How the Tory Election Machine Fell Apart’, Guardian,
accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/26/tory-election-machine-
fell-apart-negative-tactics on 3 September 2017.
Bond, D. (2017, 9 June) ‘Labour’s Slick Online Campaign Outguns Tory Press’, Financial
Times.
Bush, S. (2017, 27 June) ‘How Theresa May Abandoned David Cameron’s
Playbook—and Paid a Terrible Price’, New Statesman, accessed at http://www.newsta
tesman.com/politics/elections/2017/06/how-theresa-may-abandoned-david-camerons-
playbook-and-paid-terrible-price on 3 September 2017.
Corlett, A., Clarke, S. and Tomlinson, D. (2017) The Living Standards Audit 2017,
London, Resolution Foundation.
Conservative Party (2017) Eric Pickles’ General Election Review, London, Conservative
Party.
Deacon, D. and Smith, D. (2017, 14 June) ‘How the Conservatives’ media strategy col-
lapsed during the election campaign’, The Conversation, accessed at https://theconversa
tion.com/how-the-conservatives-media-strategy-collapsed-during-the-election-cam
paign-79291 on 3 September 2017.
Electoral Commission (2017) ‘Conservative Party Fined £70,000 Following Investigation
into Election Campaign Expenses’, accessed at https://www.electoralcommission.org.
uk/i-am-a/journalist/electoral-commission-media-centre/news-releases-donations/con
servative-party-fined-70,000-following-investigation-into-election-campaign-expenses
on 3 September 2017.
Knaus, C. (2017, 11 July) ‘Tory Pollster Lynton Crosby Says Theresa May Right to Call
Early Election, Guardian, accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/
11/tory-pollster-lynton-crosby-says-theresa-may-right-to-call-early-general-election
on 3 September 2017.
Lowe, M. (2017, 13 June) ‘Social Care, May Ducking TV Debates, Fox Hunting: What
Sank Our Candidacies in the West Midlands’, Conservative Home, accessed at http://
www.conservativehome.com/platform/2017/06/michelle-lowe-social-care-may-duck
ing-tv-debates-fox-hunting-what-sank-my-candidacy-in-the-west-midlands.html on 3
September 2017.
Maltby, K. (2017, 9 June) ‘Theresa May Rejected the Tory Detoxification Project. That’s
What’s Behind This Mess’, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
’We Didn’t See it Coming’: The Conservatives 57
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/71/suppl_1/46/4930853
by Sussex Language Institute user
on 05 April 2018
2017/jun/09/theresa-may-rejected-tory-detoxification-behind-this-mess on 3 September
2017.
McTague, T., Cooper, C. and Dickson, A. (2017, 6 July) ‘How Theresa Lost It’, Politico.eu,
accessed at http://www.politico.eu/article/how-theresa-may-lost-it-uk-election-brexit-
jeremy-corbyn-jim-messina-lynton-crosby-uk-sarah-palin-campaign/ on 3 September
2017.
Morgan, R. (2017, 14 July) ‘CCHQ Must Rebuild its Digital Strategy from the Ground Up’,
Conservative Home, accessed at http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2017/07/
richard-morgan-cchq-must-rebuild-its-digital-strategy-from-the-ground-up.html on 3
September 2017.
Newton, K. (2006) ‘May the Weak Force Be With You: The Power of the Mass Media in
Modern Politics’, European Journal of Political Research, 45, 209–234.
Perrior, K. (2017, 15 July) ‘Inside Team Theresa’, Times Magazine.
Prince, R. (2017) Theresa May: The Enigmatic Prime Minister London, Biteback.
Ridge-Newman, A. (2014) Cameron’s Conservatives and the Internet: Change, Culture and
Cyber Toryism, London, Palgrave.
Savage, M. (2017, 23 July) ‘Tory Members Turn to David Davis in Battle to Succeed
Theresa May’, Observer.
Shipman, T. (2017, 11 June) ‘I Look Stupid, Not Strong and Stable, May Said’, Sunday
Times.
Timothy, N. (2017, 17 June) ‘Where We Went Wrong’, Spectator, accessed at https://
www.spectator.co.uk/2017/06/nick-timothy-where-we-went-wrong/ on 3 September
2017.
Wallace, M. (2017, 9 May) ‘Centralisation and Chaos—Inside the Rush to Select
Conservative Candidates in Time for the Election’, ConservativeHome, accessed at
http://www.conservativehome.com/thetorydiary/2017/05/centralisation-and-chaos-
inside-the-rush-to-select-conservative-candidates-in-time-for-the-election.html on 3
September 2017.
Walters, S. (2017, 3 September) ‘Bombshell Secret Memo Reveals Theresa May Defied a
Warning that Her Snap Election was a “Huge Risk” and could backfire’, Mail on
Sunday, accessed at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4847528/May-defied-
warning-snap-Election-huge-risk.html on 3 September 2017.
58 Britain Votes 2017
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/pa/article-abstract/71/suppl_1/46/4930853
by Sussex Language Institute user
on 05 April 2018
